Famous Speeches - Golda Meir - The Gaza Strip

I rise to make a statement on the problems of the Sinai Desert, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip.

On 3 December 1956 Israeli forces withdrew from the Suez Canal area
along the length of the Canal to a distance of some 50 kilometres. This
action enabled the United Nations Emergency Force to take up its
position for the first time along the Suez Canal, and to create
conditions in which the work of clearance might begin. The
Secretary-General in his discussions with Israel representatives had
indicated that the clearing of the Suez Canal was the most urgent and
immediate problem, after which one could deal with the general problem
of withdrawal in the Sinai Desert and finally with the particular
problem of the Sharm el-Sheikh area.

Subsequent phases of withdrawal carried out during December and January followed this scheme of priorities.

On 8 January 1957 Israeli forces withdrew to a more easterly line,
leaving no Israeli forces west of El Arish. As a result of this action,
the major part of the Sinai Desert was evacuated. Thus the undertaking
of the Israel Government transmitted by the Secretary-General to the
General Assembly on 24 December had been precisely fulfilled.

On 8 January, as soon as the previous phase of withdrawal had been
completed, the Israel Government informed the Secretary-General of its
decision to withdraw another 25 to 30 kilometers throughout the Sinai
Desert except in the area of Sharm el-Sheikh. This action enabled the
entry of United Nations Emergency Forces into El Arish and the St.
Catherine's Monastery.

On 14 January, one day before the previous phase of withdrawal was
due for completion, the Israel Government communicated its decision to
have the Sinai Desert entirely evacuated by Israel forces on 22 January
with the exception of the Sharm el-Sheikh area; that is the strip on
the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of
navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba. At
the same time my Government informed the Secretary-General of its
willingness to enter forthwith into conversations with him in
connection with the evacuation of this strip. At the meeting of 14
January the Israel representative also indicated the desire of my
Government to begin discussions at an early date on the arrangements
envisaged for the Gaza area.

From this narrative the General Assembly will observe that the
withdrawals in the Sinai Desert have followed an orderly system of
phasing, in coordination with the eastward movement of United Nations
Emergency Forces following closely behind. By 22 January Israel will
have evacuated approximately 30,000 sq. miles of territory which it had
held at the end of November, when the United Nations Emergency Force
first became capable of following up the Israeli withdrawals in force
as envisaged in the General Assembly's resolution of 7 November.

It is evident, therefore, that my Government cannot accept--nor can
any objective mind sustain--any criticism of Israel's action in
carrying out its undertaking of 8 November "to withdraw its forces from
Egyptian territory as soon as satisfactory arrangements can be made
with the United Nations in connection with the United Nations Emergency
Force."

On the basis of the discussions which its representatives have had
during this phased withdrawal, my Government understands that there
will not be any joint occupation in the area between Egyptian forces
and UNEF forces; we believe that it should be the policy of the United
Nations to maintain separation between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Before I discuss the complex problems which now confront us I wish
to comment on the circumstances which have attended these efforts by
Israel to fulfil the objectives of the General Assembly. The position
can be briefly stated. Throughout these weeks during which Israel has
co-operated actively with the United Nations on the withdrawal of
troops, there has not been one single act of compliance by Egypt with
the recommendations or policies of the international organisation, to
which she has looked for protection against the consequences of her own
belligerency.

While the General Assembly's resolution of 2 November established
special priority for an immediate cease-fire, it also contained other
recommendations, not one of which the Egyptian Government has shown any
intention to fulfil.

The 2 November resolution urged that "upon the cease-fire being
effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure
freedom of navigation." This objective, so vital for the security and
economic welfare of many countries, has been subjected by Egypt to
every kind of obstruction and delay; conditions and provisos have been
attached to every phase of its implementation. No action has been
spared which might slow the process down; steps essential for the
clearance of the Canal have been made conditional on the policies and
preferences of the territorial power. Negotiations aiming at
establishing international law in the operation of the Suez Canal have
been delayed, at Egypt's behest. Above all, the Egyptian Government has
given no indication that when the Canal is open it will not again be
exposed to the illegality and discrimination which Egypt has maintained
for the past six years, in defiance of a decision by the Security
Council.

A similar fate has befallen the injunction of the General Assembly
in its 2 November resolution "to desist from raids across the armistice
lines in the neighbouring territory." Fedayeen gangs, operating in
neighbouring countries under Egyptian direction, continue to spread
death and havoc throughout our countryside. Since 3 December when the
Cairo radio announced the intention of the Nasser regime to conduct
raids into Israel throughout the winter, some 30 assaults have been
committed. The official media of information in Egypt have reported
these attacks in boastful communiqués. It is evident that in this
respect, too, Egypt claims the fulfilment of Assembly resolutions by
others, without any parallel acts of compliance on her part.

Moreover, during a period in which the United Nations has used its
full influence on Egypt's behalf for the withdrawal of troops, Egyptian
policy has been masked by a grave violation of Charter principles and
of fundamental human rights. Foreign nationals have been expropriated
and deported. The Jewish community has been subjected to a persecution
recalling some of the excesses of totalitarianism before and during the
Second World War. 7,000 Egyptian Jews have been driven out by this
organised cruelty, and all the conditions for a panic-stricken exodus
have been wilfully created by the Nasser regime. Thousands of victims
have reached Israel's welcoming shores. Some member Governments, in
their direct relationships with Egypt, have been moved to express
mounting indignation and concern.

World opinion has been quick to perceive the disparity between the
assistance which Egypt has received of the United Nations, and the
complete absence of any Egyptian response to the legitimate interests
of other States and of the organised international community. The
question whether Israel is not withdrawing into a position of exposure
to renewed Egyptian belligerency, by land and sea, arises in our mind
with increasing anxiety and concern.

The acuteness of this question will be easily perceived if we recall
that twelve weeks have elapsed since my Government addressed four
questions to the Egyptian Government which have still not been
answered:

1. Does Egypt still adhere to the position declared and maintained by her over years that she is in a state of war with Israel?

2. Is Egypt prepared to enter into immediate negotiations with
Israel with a view to the establishment of peace between the two
countries as indicated in paragraph 3 of the aide-memoire of the
Government of Israel of 4 November 1956 to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations?

3. Does Egypt agree to cease economic boycott against Israel and lift the blockade of Israel shipping in the Suez Canal?

4. Does Egypt undertake to recall Fedayeen gangs under her control in other Arab countries?

In our talks with the Secretary-General on withdrawal it was
mutually understood at all times that the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza
areas were reserved for discussions at a later stage in the withdrawal
process. Thus, if the reservation of these problems to this later stage
were now made a source of criticism or blame, a serious injustice would
be incurred, to the grave prejudice of future discussions. These
problems are of special complexity; they touch the question of Israel's
security at its most sensitive point. They cannot be treated lightly,
without danger to international peace and security. In each case, a
change in the existing situation without simultaneous measures to
prevent the renewal of belligerency would lead to a possibility, nay,
even a certainty, of tension and hostility.

I now come to explain why these problems have this special
character, and why we must all work with care and precision at the
stage which we have now reached in our deliberations.

The Straits of Tiran

The strip of territory in the Sharm el Sheikh area commands the
entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran. The only
channel leading from the Red Sea to the Gulf passes between the Island
of Tiran and the southeast extremity of the Sinai coast.

This channel is three miles in width, but its navigable part is only
some 500 metres broad. Thus any ship passing to or from the Gulf of
Aqaba must come very close to the Sinai coast.

At a point in the Sharm el Sheikh area known as Ras Nasrani, Egypt
set up gun emplacements six years ago for the sole purpose of
preventing ships from sailing freely in the Gulf of Aqaba to and from
the port of Elath. Two of these were 6-inch guns and four 3-inch guns.
They were trained on the only lane usable by ships as they sail through
the Straits. These guns have blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba for the past
six years.

Sharm el Sheikh, Ras Nasrani and the neighbouring islands are
uninhabited, waterless and desolate. The only purpose of any human
presence in those places until 3 November was to prevent free access to
an international waterway. The purpose of our presence since then has
been to ensure free access. It is astonishing to observe the elaborate
installations; the ammunition depots; the airstrip; the spacious
accommodations which the Egyptians had established, with the sole aim
of obstructing the free passage of commerce between two parts of the
high seas.

These installations were established towards the end of 1949. In
reply to a query addressed to it by the American Embassy in Cairo, the
Egyptian Government, on 28 January 1950, gave assurances that it had no
intention of interfering with peaceful shipping, and that passage
through the Straits would "as in the past remain free in conformity
with international practice and with recognised principles of
international law." This Egyptian document has been recorded in full in
the verbatim records of the Security Council

In spite of this assurance, and of the fact that the Gulf of Aqaba
is a recognised waterway, Egypt has used its gun emplacements to
blockade the passage of ships bound for Elath through the Straits of
Tiran. The blockade in the Suez Canal, which was condemned by the
Security Council in 1951, has been carried out by Egypt with equal
stringency--and illegality--in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The blockade works primarily through its deterrent effect, but many
acts of force have been committed against ships exercising innocent
passage in this international waterway. Fire has been opened on
British, American and Italian ships; interference and obstruction have
been offered to vessels of Norwegian, Danish and other flags. These
acts of piracy had almost eliminated commerce and navigation in the
Gulf of Aqaba; slowed down the development of the Port of Elath;
inflicted illicit injury on Israel's economy and trade, and denied
other countries an alternative route to the Suez Canal, as a link
between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

On 3 November, when Israel forces entered the Sharm el Sheikh area
to assure Israel's self-defence against wanton belligerency, these guns
were silenced. To-day, for the first time, ships of all nations are
free to move north and south through the Straits of Tiran to and from
Elath. An alternative link to Suez joining the Red Sea and
Mediterranean is now open to all shipping without distinction of flag.

In his Note to the General Assembly the Secretary-General refers to
"the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba" which justifies
"the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the
Gulf in accordance with rules of international law." In 1949 the
International Court of Justice ruled that when straits are
geographically part of a highway used for international navigation, the
vessels of all nations enjoy the right of free passage therein, whether
or not the straits are entirely or partly within the territorial waters
of one or more states. In the words of the Court, they belong to the
class of international highways through which passage cannot be
prohibited by a coastal state.

The international character of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of
Tiran is fully confirmed by the jurisprudence of the United Nations. In
1951, the Security Council denounced the Egyptian blockade against
Israel, as inconsistent with Egypt's international obligations. In
particular, the Security Council denied Egypt the right to exercise
visit, search or seizure or to apply restrictions against shipping on
the grounds of "belligerent rights". Egypt was called upon to cease all
such practices. While the Council's decision was prompted by the
Egyptian illegalities in the Suez Canal, its judgments against visit,
search or seizure are couched in broader terms, so as to be of general
application.

In March 1954 the Security Council discussed an Israeli complaint
against Egyptian restrictions both in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of
Aqaba. The majority voted for a resolution condemning these
restrictions, wherever applied, and calling for their immediate
cessation. This resolution was presented by New Zealand and supported
by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Colombia,
Turkey and Denmark. Interpreting the majority view, the New Zealand
representative said:

"The final paragraph of the draft resolution refers only to the
complaint of interference with ships in the Gulf of Aqaba. The
arguments advanced by the representatives of Egypt in justification of
that interference cannot be sustained and in fact have already been
rejected by the Council."

Thus the illegal character of Egypt's restrictions is established by
recognised principles of international law, by the jurisprudence of the
Security Council and of the International Court of Justice; by the
consensus of the Maritime Powers; and even by Egypt's own admission in
its assurance to the United States on 28 January 1950.

Israel is the only country in the world, except Egypt, with a
coastline both on the Mediterranean and on the Red Sea. The fact that
its territory unites the Eastern and Western oceans across a land
bridge of less than 150 miles constitutes Israel's most important
geographical advantage; to have had this facility denied by illegal
action for many years is an outrage which should no longer be suffered.
Indeed, having in recent weeks experienced the use of this open
international waterway, Israel can surely not be asked to acquiesce in
its ever being closed again. The development of the southern part of
our country; the expansion of our port facilities at Elath; our right
of free commerce with friendly nations in Africa and Asia; the vision
of our country as a bridge between the traffic and ideas of the Eastern
and Western worlds; the liberation of countries in Europe and Asia from
exclusive dependence on a single Canal at Suez, exploited by Egypt to
hold other states up to injury and extortion; the consequent denial to
Egypt of a position of monopoly and domination, unhealthy both for
itself and for the maritime nations--all these great issues are bound
up in the problem of ensuring free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Straits of Tiran. The more this problem is contemplated the
bigger it becomes. It is an issue of broad international scope.

Israel is not alone in having a vital interest in the permanent
maintenance of free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Countries whose
economy depends upon the flow of trade between the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean have already suffered loss through the Egyptian blockade
in this international waterway. The Gulf, freed from the illegal
Egyptian blockade, can become a pivotal point of international
commerce. The port facilities at Elath are being constantly improved.
Communications of all kinds across the relatively short land-link
between the two seas are under active improvement; and other projects
are in a planning stage. If this position is not impaired, then no
single state, and therefore no state at all, will have a stranglehold
on the jugular vein of other nations.

The relevance of this consideration is already shown by an item appearing in this morning's New York Times.

The avoidance of any renewed blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Straits of Tiran is an objective which the Government of Israel is
resolved to pursue with the utmost tenacity. We have no national
interests superior to this. We cannot take the responsibility of
allowing this interest to be endangered, and of seeing Egyptian guns
ever again set up to obstruct the commerce of nations in this
international waterway.

Nor, I believe, will the United Nations wish to assume that
responsibility. It is unthinkable that our Organisation should, for
whatever motive, be instrumental in restoring an illicit blockade. What
would history say of the United Nations which for the past five years
has not been able to keep the Suez Canal open without discrimination,
if it should now be instrumental in obstructing the alternative route
between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean? Is it not sufficient that
Egypt's policies have denied the world the use of the Suez Canal? Must
the blockade also be brought back to the only alternative route? For
nine years Egypt has refused to maintain a legal situation in the Suez
Canal. Is it conceivable that similar discrimination should be brought
back to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran?

But this result, shocking as it seems, would certainly occur if the
United Nations were to press for Israel's withdrawal, without, at the
same time, establishing effective arrangements for ensuring permanent
freedom of navigation through the Straits and the Gulf.

Unless special measures are now instituted, Israel's withdrawal,
after an uncertain interlude of United Nations Emergency Force
occupation, would be succeeded by the establishment of Egyptian guns.
The open waterway would again become a closed lake. Ships would be
detained and assaulted. Since Israel can never again allow her
legitimate commerce to be intercepted in the Gulf, Egyptian
belligerency would have dire effects. That this prospect is very real
is proved by an Egyptian broadcast a few days ago:

"The Arabs will pursue every Israeli ship which tries to pass into the Gulf of Aqaba until they destroy her."

In August 1951, in discussing Egypt's maritime blockade, the representative of Brazil uttered a grave warning. He said:

"Should we accept the Egyptian thesis, we would be bound to
recognize any measures of reprisal adopted by the Israel Government. It
is obvious that in the exchange of hostile acts that would follow we
could hardly expect to lay the foundations of a definite solution to
the Palestine question."

Thus, the establishment of effective guarantees for permanent
freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Straits is essential not only
for the defence of international and Israeli interests, but also for
the preservation of peace. If conflict were to break out, who can be
sure to what it might lead?

Because the problem of the Sharm el Sheikh area raises such grave
issues it has been reserved for discussion to this late stage. It was
no doubt for this reason that in conversations between the Israeli
delegate and the Secretary-General it was mutually understood that the
very complication of the problems, and the international interest
involved, implied a need for negotiation in order to safeguard that
international interest and that therefore this belonged to a later
state of the general withdrawal.

Surely no delegate who studies this problem can doubt its gravity.
Our sole aim and interest in the Sharm el Sheikh area is to ensure that
we take no action now which would leave even the smallest chance of
such a tragic result as the restoration of the blockade and the
consequent renewal of regional conflict and of international tension.

On the other hand, a solution is not impossible. My delegation has
variant proposals in mind which it will be prepared to explore in the
continuing course of its discussions on the problems of withdrawal.
Ways can be sought of simultaneously reconciling two objectives--the
withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the effective guaranteeing of
permanent freedom of navigation in this international waterway.

The mere entry into this area of United Nations Emergency Force,
even with the specific aim of preventing belligerency, would not in
itself be a solution. For, there is yet no clarity about the functions
of the United Nations Emergency Force or about the duration of its
tenure. Any temporary measure for preventing belligerency and securing
free navigation would not be effective unless it were ensured in
advance that it would operate until a peace settlement were achieved,
or until some other effective measure were established by international
guarantees for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation. Such
guarantees could, perhaps, be furnished either by the principal
Maritime Powers; or by an agreement between the four coastal states; or
by some combination of the two forms of guarantee. But, if the United
Nations Emergency Force were to be regarded as a key to the solution of
this problem, greater clarity and precision would be needed in defining
its functions and the conditions and duration of its tenure.

The Gaza Strip

In his Note to the General Assembly the Secretary-General states
that "further discussions with the representatives of Israel are
required" on the question of the Gaza strip. On 14 January, Israel
representatives stated that they were ready for such discussions at an
early date. At this stage I wish only to describe the general
background of our thinking on the Gaza question.

When the State of Israel was established in 1948, the Egyptian army
crossed the Sinai Desert into the Negev, in defiance of the cease-fire
resolution of the Security Council, in an attempt to destroy Israel's
new-born independence by force of arms. The attack was held by the
Israel settlements in the Negev. The Egyptians were driven back across
the international frontier into Sinai. They succeeded, however, in
clinging to a narrow rectangular strip 6 miles wide extending north
from the Egyptian frontier for 26 miles along the Mediterranean coast
to a point within 35 miles of Tel Aviv.

The Gaza strip was an integral part of the mandated territory of
Palestine, and is geographically and economically part of the Negev.

For the eight years of its occupation by Egypt, this strip served as a base to spread terror and wreak havoc against Israel.

The bulk of the area is rural, with urban centres at Gaza, with a
population of 45,000; Khan Unis with a population of 14,000 and Rafa
with a population of 5,000. The resident population of the entire strip
is estimated at 80,000. Only about a third of the population manages to
support itself on citric-culture, date growing and some small industry.

Within the Gaza strip there live some 200,000 refugees who are fed,
clad and generally provided for by United Nations Relief and Works
Agency, and other international relief agencies. Throughout the
Egyptian occupation of Gaza, Egypt did not annex the Gaza strip, but
treated it as occupied territory provisionally administered by the
Egyptian military authorities. In a ruling given by the Cairo Court of
Administrative Jurisdiction in September 1955, it was stated that the
Gaza strip was outside Egyptian territory and that the Egyptian
authorities were exercising "a kind of control over part of the
territory of Palestine."

Throughout their occupation of the strip, which ended in November
1956, Egypt acted in Gaza as a foreign conqueror. There was no
democratic local representation in Government councils. No action was
taken to improve the impoverished condition of the area. Restrictions
were placed on the passage of persons and goods from the Gaza strip to
Egypt.

As a result of these conditions, many Gaza inhabitants fled to Jordan and to other Arab countries.

The only purpose which the Gaza strip served during the Egyptian
occupation was that of providing a convenient base for aggression
against Israel. Extending deep into the heart of Israeli territory, the
Gaza area was excellently situated as a springboard for this purpose.
Over the years, attacks were launched week by week and month by month
against the land and people of Israel, and against Israel property and
vital installations. Egypt established a closely knit chain of gun
positions along the entire demarcation line, subjecting Israel villages
to intermittent fire, making life unbearable across large areas of the
Northern Negev and the southern coastal plain. Israeli casualties in
killed and wounded as a result of Egyptian attacks, nearly all of which
emanated from the strip, totalled no less than 573. This was in
addition to innumerable cases of sabotage, mine-laying, robbery and
theft.

In the summer of 1955 the Nasser regime launched a new form of
aggression against Israel from the Gaza strip. Amongst the destitute
elements of the local population and refugee camps, the Egyptian High
Command organised fedayeen units as military formations of the Egyptian
army. In the past eighteen months, these units carried out an
intensified campaign of attack upon Israel. They ambushed road traffic,
killed men, women and children, blew up wells and water installations,
mined roads at night, demolished houses in which farmers and their
families were peacefully asleep. These outrages culminated in major
outbreaks during August and September 1955, April 1956 and October
1956.

In the ominous build-up of Egyptian forces, with offensive weapons
obtained during the first half of 1956, the Gaza strip had an essential
role both as a centre for fedayeen groups, and as the forward base of
an Egyptian Army division which was stationed there within and hour's
drive from Tel Aviv.

Since the expulsion of Egyptian forces from Gaza fedayeen have
ceased to infest the countryside. When the tensions and hostilities had
died down in early November, the refugee camps became calm. Israel
farmers and their families in the Negev had at last attained physical
security. Since 3 November no house, no school, no baby home in their
villages has been shelled from across the border.

The report submitted by the representative of the Secretary-General,
Colonel Nelson, who visited the Gaza strip at the end of November lies
before the General Assembly as Document A/3491. According to this
report "the Israel authorities have methodically established a program
to stabilise life in Gaza." "They have established law and order." "The
execution of civic responsibilities is being worked out progressively
with the local officials." "The Israel Administration allows the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency complete freedom throughout the area."
"A plan to make available basic foodstuffs at subsidised prices from
Israel Government stocks to the local non-refugee population is being
worked out." "Measures were being introduced to facilitate the
marketing of agricultural produce, citrus and dates for export from the
Gaza area. In speaking to several farmers there was evidence that
arrangements were being made through the Israeli Citrus Board to
actually export the agricultural produce."

Colonel Nelson reports on the opening of banks and credit
facilities. He certifies that "there was relatively small physical
damage caused in the area due to the events of the 2nd and 3rd of
November." "On 25 November the Israel civilian police reporting to
Israel Central Police Headquarters was established in the area, and is
being coordinated with the local police. Throughout the area one could
see both Israeli civil police and the local police patrolling." On the
other hand "there were few troops evident in the area as compared to
the concentration of Egyptian troop units prior to 2 November."

Colonel Nelson goes on to report that "water installations are
functioning throughout the area;" that "power stations in the area are
back to normal;" that telephone communication is being restored
progressively;" that "requisitioned cars and trucks are being
progressively returned to their owners;" that "hospitals are in full
operation;" that "Israel Health Ministry representatives have been in
the area to coordinate and assist."

Religious institutions in the area are pursuing their activities
without interruption. In a letter addressed on 18 November to the
Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, Monseigneur Antonio Vergani,
Vicar General in Israel of the Latin Patriarchate, stated "I have found
that everything has gone for the best and that as soon as the
occupation of the town by Israel forces had started an officer came
immediately to the Latin Church where some 1,500 persons sought refuge,
and having ascertained that no harm occurred, posted another officer
and guard."

Similar tributes to a growing stability and peace in the Gaza area
have been recorded by the Senior Vicar of the Armenian Patriarchate and
by the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee.

The future status of the Gaza strip remains to be determined. It
must be recalled that Gaza is separated from Egypt by scores of miles
of desert. The Egyptian military regime during the past eight years was
provisional in character, and of undefined legal status; and it
resulted in the decay of the area and in the impoverishment of its
population. No contribution whatever had been made by Egypt to the
solution of any part of the refugee problem, despite the fact that this
problem had been created through the invasion of Israel by Egypt and
other Arab states in 1948. It is inconceivable to my Government that
the nightmare of the previous eight years should be re-established in
Gaza with international sanction. Shall Egypt be allowed once more to
organise murder and sabotage in this strip? Shall Egypt be allowed to
condemn the local population to permanent impoverishment and to block
any solution of the refugee problem?

My Government believes that a solution of Gaza's problems, and
especially of the problem of Arab refugees can be found. On the other
hand, it must be admitted that any international force would be
powerless to prevent the return of elements which would incite and
intimidate the local population and the refugees, and the recrudescence
of fedayeen activities. Nor is it possible to maintain an area such as
the Gaza strip almost entirely devoid of economic resources in a state
of economic isolation from any adjoining territory.

It will be seen that the issues which arise are complex, and offer
no easy solution. There are difficult political and security problems
in which 80,000 residents and some 200,000 refugees are involved. It is
clear that some time is needed to work out a permanent solution of all
these problems. They cannot be solved overnight. The Government of
Israel is prepared immediately to enter into discussions in a quest for
a solution. But we must not ignore the report of the representative of
the Secretary-General who writes that "the removal of any effective
authority from the area would cause an eruption either by the refugees
or the local inhabitants in the form of looting or destruction of
property." It is not difficult to envisage what suffering and
dislocation would come upon this sorely tried region, if there were to
be an uprooting of all those elements of social, economic and municipal
stability which have now been established. Opportunities must be
nourished for bringing about radical improvement in the economic and
social condition of the inhabitants and for working out a solution of
the refugee problem. We believe that all this can be guaranteed by the
continuance of the present administrative processes, working in
cooperation with representatives of the local population and of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and in suitable contact and
relationship with the United Nations. While we are not yet ready with
final proposals, we hope shortly to present detailed plans to the
international community whereby the Gaza strip would achieve peace and
stability; whereby the economic future of the population will be
assured, and whereby the United Nations with Israel's fullest
cooperation, will be enabled to proceed effectively towards a solution
of the refugee problem. The withdrawal of Israeli military forces from
the Gaza strip can well be one of the elements in the arrangements
which we envisage.

We are ready at an early date to pursue our thinking along these
lines with the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 9 of his
note to the General Assembly. In this case, as in that of the entrance
to the Gulf of Aqaba, the desire to proceed speedily with the
fulfilment of the General Assembly's objectives on the withdrawal of
troops should be tempered by a prudent concern for the avoidance of
disruptions and dislocations and above all for the prevention of any
risk of resuming the deadly conditions of belligerency which made Gaza
a focus of international conflict during the previous eight years.

Mr. President, the General Assembly will surely have no difficulty
in concluding that the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba with its broad
international perspectives ; and the question of the Gaza strip, with
its almost unparalleled complexity, require further clarification in a
cooperative spirit. I do not doubt that if the General Assembly leaves
room for that consideration the progress already recorded in the
Secretary-General's note can be crowned by arrangements which will
eliminate the prospect of the renewal of belligerency by land and by
sea. In the pursuit of such arrangements my delegation will bend every
resource of heart and mind in the days that lie ahead.